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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO,

Case No. 860172-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Category No. 2

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for one count of
Theft, a felony of the Second Degree, and one count of Possession of
a Stolen Vehicle, a felony of the Third Degree, in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO,

:

Case No. 860172-CA

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The statement of the case and statement of facts are set
forth in Appellant's Brief at pages 1-6.

The Appellant takes this

opportunity to reply to Respondent's Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
AFTER A JUROR AND A PROSECUTION
WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A RECESS
In his opening brief, Mr. Larocco argued that he was denied
his State and Federal Constitutional rights to a fair trial by an
impartial jury because a member of his jury, Ms. Agnes Lembke,
discussed his case with state's witness Neil Hailes during a recess
at trial.

(Appellant's Brief at 8-11).

Mr. Larocco's right to an

impartial jury of his peers may also have been undermined because a
second, unnamed juror may have overheard the Lembke-Hailes

conversation.

Appellant assigns as reversible error the trial

court's failure to grant the motion for a mistrial raised
immediately after the improper juror-witness contact had occurred.
Mr. Larocco contends that the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in State
v* Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) unequivocally ratifies his
assignment of error.

Appellant's case fits squarely within Pike's

description of a constitutionally defective jury trial:

the contact

between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes was "more than incidental," and
Ms. Lembke's claim that she was not influenced by the contact in no
way rebutted the presumption of prejudice which was raised by the
contact.

State v. Pike, 712 Pc2d at 280-81.

Furthermore, the trial

court's error in failing to question the other juror who may have
overheard the conversation directly parallels the error committed by
the trial court in Pike.l

Appellant's conviction must, therefore,

be reversed.
In its response to Mr. Larocco's argument, the State
erroneously contends:

(1)

that the contact between Ms. Lembke and

Mr. Hailes was brief and inadvertent (see State's Brief at 6 and
11), (2) that Mr. Hailes' conversation with Ms. Lembke, including
his remarks concerning the general veracity of police officers,
could not have prejudiced the proceedings because Mr. Hailes'
testimony was "inconsequential" in the case and because none of the
testimony given by police officers was ever contested by the defense
(see State's Brief at 7-9), (3) that even if a presumption of

^The trial judge in the Pike case cut off the in-camera questioning
of the witness who had conversed with a juror before the court had
any real indication of what may have been discussed by the witness
and juror. Pike, at 279.
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prejudice did arise in this case, the presumption was rebutted by
Ms. Lembke's claim that she was not influenced by the contact with
Mr* Hailes (see Statefs Brief at 10), (4) that the present case is
distinguishable from Pike because the entire juror-witness
conversation was uncovered and scrutinized in this case, but was not
in Pike (see State's Brief at 9-10), and (5) that the court had no
obligation to voir dire the unnamed juror because "it is clear from
the record [that she] was not present when the encounter between Ms.
Lembke and Mr. Hailes took place11 (See State's Brief at 12). In
light of the rationale underpinning the Pike opinion, the State's
contentions are meritless.
The conversation between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes was not
a "brief and inadvertent" exchange as that phrase is implicitly
defined in Pike*

On the facts of the Pike case—involving a

prosecution witness who told three jurors about "an accident he had
sustained while cleaning his patio which caused him to limp," Pike
at 280—this Court concluded "the conversation [in question]
amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact and no doubt had
the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly
affect the jurors' judgment as to credibility."

Pike at 281. As in

Pike, the conversation in the present case involved the friendly
sort of chit-chat which can readily breed a "sense of familiarity"
not only between a juror and a witness, but also between a juror and
one of the parties in the case (see Appellant's Brief at 11-12).2

^While the Pike opinion does not explicitly point to the danger of a
juror aligning herself with one party or the other in the wake of
improper contact with a witness, Mr. Larocco urges the Court to
consider such a possibility in this case.
- 3 -

Furthermore, as Appellant pointed out in his opening brief, the
conversation between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes extended beyond a
merely friendly exchange when Mr. Hailes propounded upon the general
credibility of police officers.

Such a comment at least raises the

possibility that the juror-witness contact was not "inadvertent."
The trial court erred both in failing to prevent this contact and in
refusing to declare a mistrial once such potentially damaging
contact had occurred.

Regardless of what Mr. Hailes had in mind

when he initiated the conversation with Ms. Lembke, the
juror-witness exchange in this case clearly exceeded the level of
impropriety reached by the conversation in Pike.

Mr. Larocco

respectfully urges this Court to agree that the Lembke-Hailes
conversation, like the conversation in Pike, "was sufficient to
warrant a presumption of prejudice."

Pike, at 281.

The State concedes that "[t]he type of contact that
occurred between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes should be avoided."
State's Brief at 11.)

(See

Despite this concession, however, the State

seems to argue that the Pike case should be narrowly limited to its
facts (see State's brief at 7-9 and state's enumerated contention
#(2) above).

Surely the rationale of the Pike-Anderson doctrine^

extends to afford protection to individuals in Mr. Larocco's
situation.

Surely the rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises as

readily in the instant case as it does in the case where the state's
central witness converses with a juror (State v. Pike), or in the
^Appellant's reference to the "Pike-Anderson doctrine" derives from
the Utah Supreme Court's central reliance on State v. Anderson, 237
P 941 (1925) (holding that improper juror-witness contact raises a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice) in the Pike opinion. Pike, at
280.
- 4 -

case where the witness rides to and from the courthouse with a juror
(State v. Anderson).

In all three situations it cannot "be said

that appellant had the full benefit of trial by an impartial jury
and was in no way influenced except by the evidence and the
instructions of the court."

Pike at 280 (quoting State v. Anderson,

supra, at 943).
While it is true that the conversation between Mr. Hailes
and Ms. Lembke may not have impacted Ms. Lembke's assessment of any
of the prosecution's witnesses' credibility (see State's Brief at
7-9), at least two problems outside of the realm of influencing
witness credibility may have arisen due to the improper contact.
First, Ms. Lembke, and the unnamed witness, may have had a tendency
to align themselves with the state's case due to familiarity with
Mr. Hailes.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the appearance

of impropriety and the nagging doubt as to whether Mr. Larocco
received a fair trial produce a serious, "deleterious effect upon
the Judicial process."

Pike, at 280. The danger the Utah Supreme

Court sought to guard against with its "stringent [rebuttal
presumption] rule" is that subtle, insidious form of prejudice which
"may well exist even though it is not provable and even though a
person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to recognize
that fact."

Pike, at 280. For these reasons, the presumption of

prejudice arose as strongly in the present case as in Pike.
Once the presumption of prejudice arises in any given case,
a juror may not rebut the presumption for the state simply by
insisting that the improper contact did not influence him.

- 5
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Pike, at

281.

It is not clear from the Pike opinion what the State would

have to show in order to successfully rebut the presumption;
however, it is clear that the Utah Supreme Court's "stringent rule"
places a very difficult burden on the Statefs shoulders.

Appellant

contends that this difficult burden has been wisely placed*

the

prosecution and the court should take whatever preventive measures
are necessary to keep the jury and the state's witnesses separated
in a criminal case, first, because it is nearly impossible to prove
"how or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by conversing"
with a State's witness, and second, because of the taint of
unfairness which permeates the proceedings as a result of improper
contact.

Ms. Lembke's assertion that her contact with Mr. Hailes

had no influence on her did not rebut the presumption of prejudice
which arose in this case.4

Furthermore, the court's and

prosecution's failure to seek out and question the unnamed, blonde
female juror who may have overheard the conversation (and nothing in
Ms. Lembke's statements to the court conclusively proved the unnamed
juror was out of earshot of the conversation) constituted nothing
less than flirtation with reversible, constitutional error; an
assignment of such error may be raised for the first time on
appeal.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(d) and State v. Poe/ 441

P.2d 512 (Utah 1968).

4

The state's contention that the present case should be decided
differently from Pike because Judge Dee (in the present case) fully
investigated the improper conversation, whereas Judge Banks (in the
Pike case) did not, is plainly wrong. Indeed, in State v. Anderson,
supra, the trial court more than fully investigated the improper
contact and was assured by the witness and juror involved that the
contact could not and did not influence the verdict. Despite these
assurances, this Court reversed Mr. Anderson's convictions.
- 6 -

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief,
Appellant urges this court to reverse his convictions and order
dismissal the charges against him, or, alternatively, remand his
case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this _9

day of March, 1987.
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